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CRIMINAL LAW’S FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DILEMMA: RESOLVING NEUROSCIENTIFIC AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES TO THE 
VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT 
Branden D. Jung, Esq.* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Criminal law has adopted the folk psychological view of human agency. 
Under this view, voluntary action exists and mental states, such as intentions, 
goals, and desires, have a causal relationship with bodily movement. However, 
new advances in neuroscience have begun to challenge this model and have lent 
empirical support to the idea that mental states may not play a causal role in 
bodily movement. This has profound implications for the voluntary act element 
of actus reus because the requirement presupposes the folk psychological view 
of agency. Nevertheless, criminal law can avoid this dilemma through 
praxeology, the deductive study of human action. This Article demonstrates 
through the deductive methods of praxeology that voluntary acts exist even 
assuming that mental states do not cause any bodily movement. Therefore, a 
praxeological conception of voluntariness in criminal law escapes the potential 
legal and bioethical dilemmas associated with using folk psychology in the 
voluntary act requirement. Furthermore, this Article shows that a praxeological 
theory of action is fully compatible with positive criminal law while still 
eliminating the possibility of legal voluntariness becoming a meaningless 
concept. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The defendant is a 34-year-old named Mark Smith. The victim was 
Joanne Johnson, Smith’s ex-wife. After a bitter divorce, Smith spent months 
plotting to murder Johnson. He agonized over his plans daily, until the thought 
of killing Johnson eventually consumed him. One day, Smith finally had enough 
and confronted Johnson at her place of work. Smith furiously grabbed Johnson 
at her desk and viciously stabbed her 11 times in the chest, killing her on-site. 
Shortly after, local police arrest Smith and charge him with first-degree murder. 
The year is 2049. 
For Smith to be convicted of first-degree murder, the district attorney 
must prove that Smith killed Johnson with the intent of ending a human life after 
planning and deliberation. Here, the district attorney must show that Smith’s 
stabbing of Johnson was a voluntary act. A voluntary act is defined under the law 
as a willed bodily movement.1 The district attorney presumes the voluntary act 
requirement in Smith’s case is plainly satisfied. Smith’s behavior seemed 
unequivocally willed from the evidence. Extensive video footage showed that 
Smith was awake. Numerous witnesses testify that Smith was shouting at 
Johnson while he was stabbing her while exclaiming, “I want you to die.” There 
were no signs that Smith accidentally lashed out through bodily reflexes or was 
having a night terror, nor any other evidence to suggest that his behavior was 
otherwise involuntary. However, Smith’s defense attorneys surprisingly 
challenge that his behavior was voluntary. 
At trial, the defense brings in multiple neuroscientists as expert 
witnesses. Standing behind a mountain of broadly accepted empirical research 
and peer reviewed literature, these experts testify that Smith’s feeling of intent 
or control over his bodily movement prior to stabbing his wife was merely an 
“illusion.” Employing advanced neuroimaging techniques, these experts develop 
a computational model of Smith’s mind and illustrate how Smith’s brain 
determined his physical behavior prior to Smith even forming his intention to 
 
 1  Giddeon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 175 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); see Stephen J. Morse & William T. 
Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Competence, and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, 
in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 159 (Nicole A. Vincent ed., 2013) [hereinafter 
Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior]. 
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act. Smith’s feeling of willing his bodily movement did not actually cause his 
body to move. 
Accordingly, the defense asserts that Smith’s stabbing of his ex-wife was 
not voluntary. Just as if Smith had stabbed his ex-wife while sleep-walking, 
Smith’s conscious will did not determine his bodily movement. Smith’s feeling 
of willing the stabbing was merely his mind forcibly rationalizing an already 
determined bodily movement. These arguments persuade the jury, and the jury 
finds Smith not guilty of first-degree murder. 
Although this hypothetical case may seem like science fiction today, 
new advances and theories in neuroscience have started to challenge many of the 
supposed commonsensical truths of human behavior assumed in criminal law. 
The law has stood dogmatic and complacent, as neuroscience has begun to 
reconstruct our conception of the mind and its operation. Criminal law has 
adopted the folk psychological view of human agency.2 Broadly, the folk 
psychological view of human agency is the assumption that mental states, such 
as intention, will, and desire, have a causal relationship with bodily movement.3 
Neuroscience, however, may potentially disprove this folk psychological model, 
which has profound implications for the criminal law concept of actus reus. 
In criminal law, actus reus (or “guilty act”) is one of the essential 
elements in establishing criminal culpability in American law. Actus reus refers 
to the physical aspects of a crime4 and requires a voluntary act or omission.5 A 
voluntary act is succinctly defined as a willed bodily movement,6 and an 
omission is defined as the failure to engage in a bodily movement where there is 
legal duty to act.7 The voluntary act requirement rests on a tenuous folk 
psychological foundation. Legal voluntariness depends on the idea that the 
mental state of volition (or will) can cause physical movement or lack thereof.8 
In this Article, the term will refers to the conscious mental state of intending to 
act that coincides with many bodily movements.9 In other words, will is the 
 
 2  See Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2545, 2553 (2007) [hereinafter Morse, Disappearing Person]. 
 3  See Stephen J. Morse, Common Criminal Law Compatibilism, in NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 27, 31 (Nicole A. Vincent ed., 2013) [hereinafter Morse, Common Criminal Law 
Compatibilism]. 
 4  Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 
1568 (2013). 
 5  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1 (3d ed. 2018). 
 6  Yaffe, supra note 1, at 175. See Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior, supra 
note 1, at 159. 
 7  See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2. 
 8  See infra Part II. 
 9  See Yaffe, supra note 1, at 175; see also Chris Frith, The Psychology of Volition, 229 
EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 289 (2013). 
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feeling or thought of choosing or intending a particular course of action prior to 
the physical occurrence of that course of action.10 This Article will use the terms 
will, intention, and volition interchangeably. This Article refers to the immediate 
intentions that precede action and not to mental states that occur well before one 
performs an action such as long-term goals and plans to perform an action. 
Neuroscience lends empirical support to the idea that mental states may 
merely be “epiphenomenal.” Epiphenomenalism is the philosophical claim that 
mental states do not play any causal role in bodily movement.11 If this idea is 
true, folk psychology falsely describes human behavior. The voluntary act 
requirement of actus reus could be rendered moot because the element requires 
that mental states have a causal relationship with bodily movement. 
In response to these ideas in neuroscience, this Article will argue that 
voluntary acts are still possible even if all bodily movement is not caused by any 
actor’s mental state. Criminal law should justify the possibility of voluntary 
action through praxeology instead of through folk psychological assumptions. 
Praxeology is the deductive study of human action pioneered and chiefly 
constructed by the Austrian economist and philosopher Ludwig Von Mises.12 
The methodology uses irrefutable statements regarding human action as its 
premise and deduction to formulate its theories and ideas.13  
This Article will demonstrate through praxeology that voluntary action 
is possible under the law, even as to acts where will does not cause bodily 
movement. This Article will prove this using the “action axiom.” The action 
axiom states that “human beings act.”14 Praxeological action is defined as 
“purposeful behavior” or equivalently, willed, intentional, or voluntary 
behavior.15 This Article will show that the action axiom is true and that willed 
bodily movement exists even if one assumes that mental states do not play a 
causal role in any human movement. Criminal law should use praxeology to 
explain willed bodily movement instead of folk psychology to ward off 
neuroscientific challenges to the voluntary act requirement. 
 
 10  See Judi A. Ellis & J. E. Freeman, Ten Years On: Realizing Delayed Intentions, in 
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY: COGNITIVE, NEUROSCIENCE, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 
1, 14 (Matthias Kliegel et al. eds., 2008). 
 11  See William Robinson, Epiphenomenalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ (last updated May 11, 2019). 
 12  See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE: METHOD, MONEY, AND THE 
AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 58 (1997) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE]. 
 13  See generally LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (Bettina 
Bien Greaves ed., 1998) [hereinafter MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS]. 
 14  See ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE, supra note 12, at 58. 
 15  See MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 11, 13; 
ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE, supra note 12; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC 
CONTROVERSIES 35 (2011) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC CONTROVERSIES]. 
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/8
2019] CRIMINAL LAW’S FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL DILEMMA 565 
 
Part II will first explain how the voluntary act requirement of actus reus 
is currently defined and applied and then discuss how voluntary and involuntary 
actions are distinguished under the law. This Part will also explain how these 
concepts—voluntary and involuntary—are rooted in folk psychology. Criminal 
law should not ignore the scientific problems of the folk psychological view of 
human agency. Although neuroscience undermines the law’s folk psychological 
claims, it does not undo the voluntary act requirement. If praxeology replaces the 
law’s folk psychological model of action, criminal law can still rely on the 
voluntary act requirement.  
Part III defines praxeology and provides an overview of its methods. 
This Part next applies praxeology to actus reus assuming that all bodily 
movement is not determined by mental states and demonstrates that willed action 
exists independent of any of its causes and determinants. This Part will argue that 
using praxeology as a theory of action in criminal law escapes the potential legal 
and bioethical dilemmas associated with using folk psychology to define 
voluntariness in actus reus. 
Part IV illustrates through specific legal scenarios and examples that 
praxeology is fully compatible with contemporary positive criminal law and that 
incorporating praxeological concepts into the voluntary act requirement will not 
result in any substantive changes to the law. This Part also raises and ameliorates 
potential legal or ethical concerns regarding this Article’s reformulation of the 
voluntary act requirement. 
II. THE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT 
A. Overview of the Voluntary Act Requirement 
In American criminal law, crimes contain both a mental and physical 
component.16 The mental component of a crime is known as the mens rea or 
“guilty mind.”17 Generally, crimes require a certain state of mind to establish 
criminal culpability.18 For example, in order to be guilty of the crime of larceny 
one must have actually intended to deprive another of his or her property. 
However, thoughts or states of mind alone are insufficient to constitute a crime.19 
An individual who merely thinks about stealing and depriving another 
of property cannot be found guilty of any crime.20 In addition to mens rea, crimes 
 
 16  LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 5.1. 
 17  Id. 
 18  However, for strict liability crimes, “state of mind[s] as to at least one element of the crime 
is irrelevant.” Mens Rea, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 19  LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.1. 
 20  See id. 
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require a “physical component” known as the actus reus.21 One of the elements 
of actus reus22 is the voluntary act requirement which requires (1) the existence 
of an act or an omission to act23 and (2) such act or omission must be voluntary.24 
In the law, an act is generally defined as a bodily movement whether involuntary 
or voluntary.25 Returning to the larceny example, the act would be the actual 
physical taking of another’s property by another. The law defines an omission as 
a failure to act.26 In order for an omission to exist under actus reus there must be 
a legal duty for one to act.27 For instance, United States federal law describes the 
circumstances in which citizens owe a legal duty to pay taxes. A failure to pay 
taxes in accordance with this duty could constitute an omission under the 
voluntary act requirement.28 
To satisfy the voluntary act requirement, the criminal act (or omission) 
must be voluntary. A voluntary act is an intentional or willed bodily movement.29 
Thus, unwilled bodily movements—such as spasms, convulsions, and reflexes—
are not treated as voluntary acts.30 The voluntary act requirement only looks at 
whether the actor willed the act itself. It does not look at whether the actor 
expected the consequences of the act.31 
Further, in order for there to be a voluntary act a defendant must have 
been reasonably “conscious” or aware and able to understand one’s 
circumstances and surroundings.32 Thus, seemingly goal oriented bodily 
movement such as sleepwalking would generally not be considered a voluntary 
 
 21  Farrell & Marceau, supra note 4, at 1568. 
 22  Some commentators treat the term actus reus as synonymous with voluntary act 
requirement. Id. at 1549–50. However, contemporary criminal law and the Model Penal Code treat 
actus reus as having multiple elements in addition to voluntary act requirement. Id. at 1549–50, 
1568. 
 23  LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.1. 
 24  Id. (noting that an act must be voluntary); see Farrell & Marceau, supra note 4, at 1575–76 
(describing voluntariness requirement of omissions in the law); Morse, Common Criminal Law 
Compatibilism, supra note 3, at 35; Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and 
Neuroscience, in 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010, at 529, 530 (Michael 
Freeman F.B.A. ed., 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Lost in Translation?]. 
 25  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
 26  Id. 
 27  LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.2. 
 28  Id. 
 29  See Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior, supra note 1, at 159; see also 
Yaffe, supra note 1, at 175. 
 30  Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior, supra note 1, at 159. 
 31  See Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability Based 
on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 443 (1988). 
 32  Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior, supra note 1, at 159; see Morse, Lost 
in Translation?, supra note 24, at 530. 
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act.33 If a defendant was awake and reasonably conscious, courts may presume 
an individual willed their bodily movement.34 As explained in State v. Pierson,35 
“[u]ntil something in the evidence indicates the contrary, the court may 
[constitutionally] presume the defendant intended the prohibited bodily 
movements that constitute the offense.”36 
Importantly, a legal voluntary act is a willed bodily movement, not a 
freely willed bodily. In this way, the legal definition may differ from some 
common-sense definitions of the word voluntary that are associated with 
philosophical free will. Philosophical free will is the idea that agents are able to 
make choices that are at least on some level undetermined or unconstrained by 
external factors.37 Actus reus does not require bodily movement that is 
undetermined by antecedent physical conditions and events.38 The voluntary act 
or omission element of actus reus only looks at whether a bodily movement or 
lack of movement was willed. The element does not look at what determined one 
to will that action. 
Beyond the basic and broad legal idea that a voluntary act is a willed 
bodily movement, the law vaguely defines voluntariness. The Model Penal Code 
and some jurisdictions in the United States merely define a voluntary act by what 
it is not.39 Nonetheless, one requirement is clear: “mental states,” such as 
intention, will, goals, and desires,40 must have some causal relationship with 
bodily movement for an act to be voluntary. The Model Penal Code and many 
states see that willed bodily movement is one that is a “product . . . or 
determination of the actor.”41 Implicit in this language is the requirement that 
mental states must determine or cause the bodily movement for it to be willed.42 
This idea is a legal precondition of satisfying the voluntary act requirement. In 
 
 33  See Morse, Lost in Translation?, supra note 24, at 548. 
 34  See, e.g., State v. Pierson, 514 A.2d 724, 728 (Conn. 1986). 
 35  514 A.2d 724 (Conn. 1986). 
 36  Id. at 728. 
 37  Timothy O’Connor & Christopher Franklin, Free Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ (last updated Aug. 21, 2018). 
 38  See Morse, Common Criminal Law Compatibilism, supra note 3, at 39–41. 
 39  See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13–2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 5.1; 
Morse & Newsome, Prediction of Criminal Behavior, supra note 1, at 159. 
 40  See Morse, Common Criminal Law Compatibilism, supra note 3, at 39–41. 
 41  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (emphasis added); see also LAFAVE, 
supra note 5, § 5.1. 
 42  See Paul Sheldon Davies, Skepticism Concerning Human Agency: Sciences of the Self 
Versus “Voluntariness” in the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE & LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 113, 113–15 
(Nicole A. Vincent ed., 2013). 
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sum, criminal law’s theory of action is folk psychological.43 In other words, this 
theory of action presumes that mental states have some causal relationship with 
bodily movement.44  
The folk psychological view of agency is ubiquitous in the law. In order 
to better illustrate folk psychological conceptions of agency to the reader, this 
Article examines how causal explanations of behavior are typically given in the 
law. 
First, one should consider the role of mental state causation in the law in 
order to illustrate the folk psychological view of human agency. Consider a 
commonplace legal scenario. Jim broke into Sally’s car and removed her radio. 
In a criminal action, Jim pleads guilty and admits that he broke into her car to 
steal her radio because he could not afford his own. The reader could ask a lawyer 
or judge, “So why did Jim break into Sally’s car and take her radio?” A judge or 
lawyer would say, “Assuming Jim was not lying, Jim broke into Sally’s car and 
removed the radio because he wanted to steal her radio.” Seemingly, this would 
be an obvious explanation of Jim’s behavior and would not be second-guessed 
in a courtroom or in a judicial opinion. This explanation though is also folk 
psychological. Jim’s bodily movement of breaking into the car and taking the 
radio was caused by a mental state: Jim’s goal to steal the radio. Jim’s mental 
state explains the bodily movement. 
Furthermore, there is a second layer to the implicit folk psychology 
described above. Although actus reus is considered the physical or objective 
component of a crime, the element also presupposes a role of mental states in the 
voluntary act requirement. Let us consider only the actus reus of the crime, Jim’s 
physical act of taking the radio, in isolation without reference to his particular 
goals in acting. We will assume that there is conflicting evidence regarding Jim’s 
reasoning for taking the radio. We only know with certainty that Jim had an 
intention to remove the radio from Sally’s car and Jim correspondingly 
physically removed the radio from Sally’s car. Nevertheless, there is still a 
legally uncontroversial causal explanation of Jim’s behavior. One could validly 
causally explain Jim’s behavior by generally stating that Jim had the intention to 
remove the radio and this intention caused his body to take the radio out of 
Sally’s car. Even if one did not know specifically why Jim wanted to take the 
radio, one would know that Jim had at least some mental state of intention to 
remove the radio and could presume this was causally related to Jim’s bodily 
movements. This could be another seemingly innocuous folk psychological 
explanation of Jim’s behavior under the law. 
 
 
 43  See Morse, Disappearing Person, supra note 2, at 2545; see also Stephen J. Morse, 
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from 
Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Morse, Death of Folk Psychology]. 
 44  See Morse, Disappearing Person, supra note 2, at 2571–72. 
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/8










Perfunctorily, explaining Jim’s behavior through folk psychology in 
either of these examples does not appear problematic. The layperson would 
probably consider these behavioral explanations as commonsensical truths. 
Nonetheless, many scientists and philosophers of mind have attacked folk 
psychology as pre-scientific.45 Deeper theoretical analysis into Jim’s actions can 
reveal how folk psychological explanations of Jim’s behavior could be 
scientifically precarious.  
Another way to explain Jim’s behavior is “mechanistically,” or in other 
words, explaining Jim’s behavior through physical events and mechanisms. Jim 
is a physical entity like everything else in the world. Jim is composed of organs 
 
 45  See Morse, Lost in Translation?, supra note 24, at 532. See also Davies, supra note 42, at 
113–15. 
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and tissue, which are composed of cells, which are further composed of chemical 
compounds. A general mechanistic explanation of Jim’s behavior could be that 
Jim removed the radio out of Sally’s car because chemical events in Jim’s brain 
sent signals to Jim’s nervous system causing Jim’s muscles to move. A 
mechanistic explanation of Jim’s behavior like this is not per se incompatible 
with a folk psychological explanation of Jim’s behavior. One could say that 
chemical events in Jim’s brain create mental states and these mental states set in 
motion the physical events that caused Jim to move. This explanation would 
effectively be synonymous with saying Jim’s mental state caused Jim to move 
his body.  
However, what if that was not the mechanistic explanation of Jim’s 
bodily movement? For instance, what if chemical events entirely independent of 
the chemical events that determined Jim’s mental state determined Jim’s bodily 
movement? For example, assume that prior to Jim’s mental state forming, 
separate chemical events set off a chain of events to cause Jim’s body to move. 
Jim’s body would move whether Jim had a goal of moving his body. These 
preceding chemical events then influenced the cognitive systems that established 
Jim’s mental state and caused Jim’s mental state to correspond with the 
impending and inevitable bodily movement. If such a model of the mind were 
true, the folk psychological explanation of Jim’s behavior—that Jim removed the 
radio because he wanted to steal from Sally—would be false. 
B. The Neuroscientific and Philosophical Challenges of the Voluntary Act 
Requirement and the Folk Psychological View of Human Agency 
The potential scientific problems with folk psychology extend far deeper 
than challenging the descriptive and explanatory devices of lawyers and judges. 
As noted, criminal law makes the folk psychological model of agency a 
substantive legal requirement of the voluntary act element of actus reus. 
Therefore, if the folk psychological view of human agency were incorrect, the 
voluntary act requirement would be rendered an empty and vacuous legal 
concept that could never be legally established. 
The hypothetical mechanistic model of action that undermines folk 
psychology this Article outlined is not merely a conceptual possibility. 
Experiments in neuroscience suggest similar models of action with equivalently 
fatal implications for criminal law’s folk psychology. For example, the famous 
“Libet experiments” provide an empirical backdrop to the idea that intention and 
bodily movement could be caused by separate mental mechanisms.46 In the Libet 
experiments, the experimenters asked each subject to move a finger at will 
whenever the subject felt the urge to move their finger.47 Experimenters attached 
 
 46  See generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 49 (MIT Press 2002). 
 47  Id. at 52. 
10
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participants to electromyography (“EMG”) electrodes on their finger and 
electroencephalography (“EEG”) electrodes on their scalp to measure “readiness 
potential”48—which is the increased electrical activity in the motor portions of 
the brain that occurs prior to conscious bodily movement.49 The experimenters 
also asked participants to report when they experienced an intention or a 
conscious awareness of wanting to perform a finger movement.50 The subjects 
did this by reciting the position of an arm of a nearby clock as soon as the subjects 
felt a willing to move their right index finger.51 
The experiment yielded intriguing results. The readiness potential onset 
occurred before participants even formed an intention to move their finger.52 
Neural activity preceded intention by approximately 350 milliseconds.53 Libet 
and his colleagues succinctly stated the takeaway: 
It is concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely 
voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is 
any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a “decision” 
to act has already been initiated cerebrally. This introduces 
certain constraints on the potentiality for conscious initiation 
and control of voluntary acts.54  
Figure 2 below provides a visual timeline of Libet’s results. 
 
Figure 2  
 
 48  Id. 
 49  See id. at 47. 
 50  Id. at 49. 
 51  Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral 
Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 
623, 623 (1983). 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
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The Libet experiments were criticized methodologically for the use of 
“self-reported timing and subjective memory.”55 For example, Daniel Dennett 
has clamorously argued that it is unclear whether the Libet experiments actually 
measured the timing of intention. Dennett argues that in order to say that the 
Libet experiments measured the intention to move, one must also say that the 
mind’s visual processing of the clock’s position did not cause any delay in the 
subject’s time recitation. Dennett writes: 
[I]t is quite possible that you were in fact conscious of the 
decision to flick at the very moment you made it, but it then took 
you more than 300 milliseconds to move to the vision center and 
pick up an image of the clock face showing the position of the 
moving millisecond mark, so you misjudged the simultaneity 
because you lost track of how long it took you to get from place 
to place.56 
In 2008, Masao Matsuhashi and Mark Hallett addressed methodological 
criticisms surrounding Libet’s reliance on subjective, self-reported timing.57 
Instead of relying on self-reported timing and subjective recall, Matsuhashi and 
Hallet’s experiments estimated the timing of intention using the subjects’          
real-time decisions of whether or not they had an intention to move.58 In the 
experiment, experimenters asked the subjects to perform swift finger movement 
without planning the finger movements.59 Experimenters asked the subjects to 
move their fingers immediately whenever they thought about moving their 
 
 55  Masao Matsuhashi & Mark Hallett, The Timing of the Conscious Intention to Move, 28 EUR. 
J. NEUROSCIENCE 2344, 2344 (2008). 
 56  Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a Responding—and Responsible—Artifact, 1001 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 42–43 (2003). 
 57  See Matsuhashi & Hallett, supra note 55. 
 58  Id. at 2344. 
 59  See id. at 2345. 
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fingers.60 Experimenters played a “stop” tone at pseudo-random intervals.61 
Experimenters asked the subjects to cancel their finger movements if they had 
an intention to move their finger whenever they heard a tone and to ignore the 
tone if they did not currently have an intention to move their fingers.62 The 
experimenters also recorded the timing of any instances of what Matsuhashi and 
Hallett called “movement genesis,” or the physiological neural activity that 
occurs prior to movement.63 Whenever there was a finger movement, the 
experimenters recorded any tones that occurred prior to that finger movement.64 
Thus, the experimenters were able to document when the subjects were unaware 
of their movement genesis.65 This is because if the subject were aware of the 
movement genesis after hearing the tone they would have “vetoed” or stopped 
the finger movement that followed.66 Matsuhashi and Hallett could then estimate 
the timing of intention with minimal reliance the subject’s subjective knowledge 
by measuring the timing of tones that prevented finger movement.67 Through 
statistical analysis, Matsuhashi and Hallett found an even longer gap between the 
readiness potential and the intention to act of one second.68  
It is not yet clear what the readiness potential that precedes bodily 
movement precisely is.69 However, as the social psychologist Daniel Wegner 
claims, the activity preceding the finger movement could be the cause of bodily 
movement itself and the intention to move the finger is a separate, non-causal 
event.70 This interpretation is temporally consistent with Libet’s findings. 
Statistically consistent cerebral activity was occurring in the brain prior to the 
subjects ever thinking about wanting to move their fingers. If intentions cause 
bodily movements, why was there increased cerebral activity in the brain prior 
to the subjects even consciously intending to move their fingers? Intention may 
merely be an epiphenomenal mental event. 
If intentions do not cause bodily movement, as these experiments may 
suggest, the folk psychology of criminal law is wrong. One can mechanistically 
explain action in a way inconsistent with folk psychological explanations of 
action. The experiments that show that intention could be the stepping-stones for 
 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. at 2346. 
 63  Id. at 2344. 
 64  Id. at 2348. 
 65  See id. at 2344. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. at 2344. 
 68  See id. at 2345–49. 
 69  See generally WEGNER, supra note 46.  
 70  See id. 
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a legal conundrum similar to the murder case hypothetical in the introduction of 
this Article. The experiments create an empirical possibility of expert witnesses 
one day being able to disprove seemingly obvious legally voluntary acts. As the 
voluntary act requirement presumes the folk psychological view of agency as a 
matter of substantive law, the voluntary act requirement may eventually come 
into legal question in a way contrary to common sense. 
Nevertheless, some legal scholars have addressed criticisms of the law’s 
folk psychology and have attempted to defend its use. For example, Stephen 
Morse has polemically attacked theoretical challenges to folk psychology. Morse 
has argued that these challenges are merely empirically unsupported intellectual 
musings: 
Given how little we know about the brain-mind-action 
connections, to claim based on neuroscience that we should 
radically change our picture of ourselves and our legal doctrines 
and practices is a form of neuroarrogance . . . . It is possible that 
we are not agents and that mental states are epiphenomenal, but 
the current science does not remotely demonstrate this is true. 
The burden of persuasion is firmly on the proponents of the 
radical view. There is simply no present justification for 
concluding that the foundation of folk psychological view of 
agency upon which criminal law is based is incorrect. 71 
Of particular issue to criminal law, Morse has expressed concern that the 
Libet and similar experiments involved arbitrary and unplanned finger 
movements that may be irrelevant to criminal law. Some scholars have argued 
that the findings of these studies are not generalizable for all human behavior. 
Morse has asserted that the empirical support for readiness potential preceding 
intention for deliberated and planned behavior is much weaker. He argues that 
the “trivial” behavior of the Libet paradigm experiments “is a far cry from the 
behavioral concerns of the criminal law or morality, which address intentional 
conduct in contexts when there is always good reason to refrain from harming 
another or to act beneficently.”72 
This position is wrongheaded. Criminal law is not only concerned with 
carefully crafted and deliberated behavior as Morse implies. Criminal law also 
deals with arbitrary and “trivial” behavior that is similar to the behavior studied 
in the Libet paradigm experiments. 
Traffic law illuminates this assertion. Every day, drivers engage in 
bodily movement that is not thoroughly planned or conducted with particular, 
conscious scrutiny. Habitual driving often involves little thoughtful decision 
making in a manner similar to simple tasks, such as rapid arbitrary finger 
 
 71  See Morse, Common Criminal Law Compatibilism, supra note 3, at 44. 
 72  Morse, Death of Folk Psychology, supra note 43, at 31. 
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movement. Nevertheless, drivers are still subject to traffic laws and criminal 
sanctions. Although mens rea is generally not an element of most traffic laws, 
all criminal traffic laws incorporate actus reus and the voluntary act requirement. 
As demonstrated in Part I, the voluntary act element of actus reus requires folk 
psychology. For bodily movement to be willed, it must be of the determination 
of the actor’s intention. Even if we accept the idea that the challenges to folk 
psychology only hold for “trivial” behavior, the folk psychological presumption 
embedded in the voluntary act requirement is still tenuous. For example, one 
could potentially show that behavior analogous to rapid finger movements such 
as speeding or running red lights are not bodily movements caused by intention 
and correspondingly are not voluntary acts. All areas of criminal law that involve 
these types of acts could become conceptually moot. The legal implications for 
criminal law are decisively problematic. 
Morse has also specifically attacked the Libet experiments and the 
possible inferences that scholars such as Wegner have suggested on                     
non-methodological grounds.73 Morse and other defenders of folk psychology 
aver that simply because neural activity precedes intention this does not mean 
intention does not cause bodily movement.74 This claim is facially plausible: an 
alternative interpretation of the cerebral activity that preceded the subjects’ 
intentions could be the neural events that cause both the bodily movement and 
the intention.  
However, these arguments are wrong in an important respect. Just as 
though the fact that neural activity precedes intention alone does not conclusively 
show that intention does not cause bodily movement, it also does not 
conclusively show that intention causes bodily movement. Why should the 
burden of persuasion wholly fall on critics of folk psychology as Morse suggests?  
In fact, a 2008 non-Libet paradigm experiment conducted by the 
neuroscientist Chun Siong Soon and his colleagues suggests that the burden of 
persuasion should fall on proponents of folk psychological view of agency 
because it empirically challenges the presumed causal relationship between 
intention and action. In this experiment, the researchers instructed the subjects to 
freely decide to press one of two buttons.75 Unlike the Libet paradigm 
experiments, this experiment monitored brain activity using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (“fMRI”). Using data from the fMRI, the researchers found 
that activity in the frontopolar and parietal cortex regions of the brain had 
“considerable information” that could predict with 60% accuracy which button 
the subjects would press seven to ten seconds prior to the subject’s conscious 
 
 73  Id. at 29–31. 
 74  See id. 
 75  Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, 
11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543 (2008). 
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intention to press a button.76 The study suggests that unconscious mental activity 
that occurs well in advance of the intention may be determinative of future 
action.77 As the researchers concluded, “this suggests that when the subject’s 
decision reached awareness it had been influenced by unconscious brain activity 
for up to 10 [seconds].”78 If the folk psychological claim that intentions cause 
bodily movement were true, this is a peculiar result. Given the statistically 
significant relationship between unconscious brain activity prior to intention and 
bodily movement, this study provides empirical evidence that unconscious brain 
activity prior to intention could be a confounding variable in the commonly 
presumed causal relationship between intention and action. Thus, the 
relationship between intention and action may be spurious. Unconscious brain 
activity may be causing both the action and the intention, which leads to the 
correlation between bodily movement and intention. 
Furthermore, folk psychology depends upon our intuitive 
understandings and assumptions about ourselves that our intentions cause our 
actions.79 However, we do not know if these assumptions are true. These 
assumptions are not true only because one cannot conclusively show they are 
false. We arrive at these assumptions because we infer mental state causation 
from precise conjunction of intention and bodily movement that we observe in 
daily life. Certainly, intention and bodily movement are highly correlated, but 
correlation alone does not imply causation. This inference is reinforced in our 
minds by the feeling of “doing” or causing our actions when we act. However, 
there is evidence in psychology that our introspective assumptions about how 
other people causally operate can be systematically misguided. These systematic 
biases of understanding ourselves further indicate that the burden persuasion 
actually falls upon the proponents of folk psychology. 
For example, the psychological theory of apparent mental causation 
shows the feeling of causing action should not buttress folk psychology.80 The 
theory states that “people experience conscious will [or the feeling of ‘doing’ or 
causing our actions] when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their 
action.”81 The feeling of doing is not a “direct readout of some psychological 
force that causes action from inside the head.”82 The feeling of causing action is 
not an observation of cause, but an apparent perception of cause. Experiments 
 
 76  See id. at 546. 
 77  See id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  See Andrew E. Lelling, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1993). 
 80  See WEGNER, supra note 46, at 64. 
 81  See id. (emphasis omitted). 
 82  Id. at 65. 
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have shown that people can be readily deceived into feeling their mental states 
have caused an action when in fact they played no causal role.83 Phantom limb 
experiences are well-known examples of how the feeling of causing bodily 
movement can only be apparent.84 Individuals with amputated limbs often 
experience sensations of voluntarily causing their missing body part to move 
even though their body part is not there and obviously could not have moved.85 
In addition, the theory of naïve realism provides evidence that our 
introspective conceptions of ourselves are systematically skewed and that the law 
should be skeptical of folk psychology. 86 The theory states that (1) “[w]e tend to 
assume that we see things in an unmediated and objective manner” even when 
we do not; (2) “[w]e tend to assume that other rational persons will see things as 
we do”; and (3) “[w]e tend to dismiss those who disagree as ignorant, slothful, 
irrational or biased.”87 If we apply this idea to the folk psychological view of 
agency, the nature of the truth of mental states causing bodily movement 
becomes suspect. We believe that our intentions cause our bodily movements 
because our perceptions tell us that we caused our bodily movements. We form 
these understandings because we see correlations between our intentions and our 
bodily movements, and our intentions give us the feeling that we are causing our 
bodily movement. These subjective observations do not necessarily comport 
with objective truth. Despite this, we treat what we subjectively observe as 
objective reality even though we have no evidence for this other than our feelings 
and intuitive understandings. 
Moreover, we take these subjective understandings of ourselves and 
apply them to others. We assume that because we feel that intentions cause our 
body to move, this must also be true for others. Our only basis for this assumption 
is through our own subjective feelings. This systematic bias of objectivity also 
affects how we interpret challenges to our common-sense beliefs. We are 
systematically skeptical of ideas regarding the causal origins of bodily movement 
that contradict our intuitions. These biases cause us to believe that the burden of 
proof should fall on critics of folk psychology. Yet because this assumption about 
the burden of proof is derived from psychological biases, we should in fact take 
the position that is opposed to our intuitive assumptions about our behavior. If 
our goal is to find the truth about legal voluntary action in an objective manner, 
then we need to counter our introspective biases. The law cannot idly acquiesce 
to folk psychology because there is not conclusive proof that is not true. The 
evidentiary burden of proof falls upon folk psychology. Proponents of the folk 
 
 83  See id. at 74. 
 84  See V. S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein, The Perception of Phantom Limbs, 121 BRAIN 
1603, 1607 (1998). 
 85  See id.; WEGNER, supra note 46, at 40. 
 86  See Davies, supra note 42, at 121. 
 87  See id. 
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psychological view of agency must demonstrate that this view is true in order to 
conclude that it is true. 
In sum, criminal law cannot ignore the growing challenges to folk 
psychology. The voluntary act element of actus reus requires folk psychology as 
matter of substantive law. Although neuroscience does not yet conclusively show 
that folk psychology is wrong, neuroscience has created an empirical basis for 
the possibility that mental states play no causal role in bodily movement. Folk 
psychology relies on introspective assumptions about human beings that are 
systematically skewed. Consequently, the burden of persuasion falls on 
advocates of folk psychology. This idea and developments in neuroscience show 
that the law should be skeptical about its use of folk psychology in the voluntary 
act element of actus reus. Although all is not lost for the proponents of the 
voluntary act requirement and willed bodily movement. Advocates of these legal 
ideas do not need to rely on or prove folk psychology if praxeology is used 
instead.  
One can demonstrate the possibility of willed bodily movement without 
using or defending folk psychology through praxeology. As alluded to in the 
introduction of this Article, praxeology can show that willed bodily movement 
exists without reference to the causal origins of action. Given this is possible, 
criminal law should eschew folk psychological agency as a precondition of the 
voluntary act requirement. 
III. PRAXEOLOGY AND THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT 
A. The Action Axiom 
Praxeology is the deductive study of human action.88 Praxeology begins 
with irrefutable statements regarding action and reality as premises and uses 
deduction to formulate theories and ideas.89 The philosopher and Austrian 
economist Ludwig Von Mises was the chief architect of the methodology.90 
Austrian Economics is a school of economic thought that studies the purposeful 
actions of human beings,91 and praxeology is one of the distinctive 
methodologies in the discipline.92 Praxeology has been infrequently applied to 
disciplines outside of economics.93 However, as this Article demonstrates, 
 
 88  See ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE, supra note 12.  
 89  See id. 
 90  See id. at 58. 
 91  See generally Deborah L. Walker, Austrian Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS (2008). 
 92  ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE, supra note 12, at 58. 
 93  See id. at 74. 
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/8
2019] CRIMINAL LAW’S FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL DILEMMA 579 
 
praxeological ideas can be validly applied to legal issues, and praxeology can 
resolve the law’s folk psychology and voluntary act debate. 
A core tenet of praxeology is the action axiom.94 The action axiom states 
that “human beings act”; human beings employ means aimed at willed and 
desired ends.95 Praxeological action encompasses voluntary acts and omissions 
under the law. Voluntary acts or omissions under the law are defined as 
intentional or willed behavior.96 Equivalently, praxeological action is willed, 
purposeful, intentional, or voluntary behavior.97 It is the act of willing and [the] 
choosing of means.98 Praxeological action is a “manifestation of a man’s will.”99 
Thus, alternatively, the action axiom states, “human beings engage in willed 
behavior.” Hereinafter, this Article will refer to praxeological action as merely 
“action.”  
Voluntary acts or intentional bodily movements, which exclude 
unwilled, reflexive behavior, are a category of action. As Austrian economist 
Murray Rothbard wrote, action is “sharply distinguishable from those observed 
movements which, from the point of view of man, are not purposeful. These 
include all the observed movements of inorganic matter and those types of 
human behavior that are purely reflex, that are simply involuntary responses to 
certain stimuli”.100 
 Further, the action axiom applies not only to voluntary acts in the law, 
but also voluntary omissions. A voluntary omission is a type of action. A willed 
choice to not engage in bodily movement is still a willed choice where the action 
axiom applies. Mises carefully illustrates this point: 
To do nothing and to be idle are also action, they too determine 
the course of events. Wherever the conditions for human 
interference are present, man acts no matter whether he 
interferes or refrains from interfering. He who endures what he 
could change acts no less than he who interferes in order to attain 
another result. A man who abstains from influencing the 
operation of physiological and instinctive factors which he could 
 
 94  See id.   
 95  Id. 
 96  See supra Part I. 
 97  See MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 11, 13; 
ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC CONTROVERSIES, supra note 15, at 35; ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION 
ONE, supra note 12. 
 98  See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND MARKET 1 
(2001). 
 99  MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 13. 
 100  ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC CONTROVERSIES, supra note 15, at 15. 
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influence also acts. Action is not only doing but no less omitting 
to do what possibly could be done.101 
The action axiom is a true “a priori synthetic proposition” and a logically 
irrefutable truth.102 This section shall overview the analytic-synthetic and a 
priori-a posteriori distinctions in philosophy to explicate this claim.  
An analytic proposition is a proposition where the predicate concept is 
contained in its subject concept.103 These statements are true by definition104 and 
the means of formal logic alone is sufficient to establish their truth.105 For 
example, “Frozen water is ice”; “Bachelors are unmarried men”; “Two halves 
make up a whole” are each true by definition.106 These statements do not give 
information about anything outside of the grammatical and semantic structure of 
the statements.  
By contrast, in a synthetic proposition the predicate concept is not 
contained in its subject concept.107 Synthetic propositions state something 
outside of the sentence itself and are not true merely by virtue of the language 
used. Thus, the action axiom that human beings are able to act purposively is a 
synthetic proposition because it is not inherently true by definition. The predicate 
concept of “being able to act purposively” is not synonymous with the subject 
concept of “human beings.” 
 
 101  MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 11. 
 102  See generally HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND THE AUSTRIAN METHOD 
(1995). The economist and philosopher Murray Rothbard rejected the “a priori” label of the action 
axiom: 
Whether we consider the Action Axiom ‘a priori’ or ‘empirical’ depends on 
our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo-Kantian 
tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a categorical truth 
a priori to all experience. My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle 
and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would interpret the proposition 
differently. I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law of 
thought, and hence ‘empirical’ rather than ‘a priori.’ 
Murray N. Rothbard, In Defense of “Extreme Apriorism”, 23 S. ECON. J. 314, 317–18 (1957) 
[hereinafter Rothbard, Extreme Apriorism]. However, he notes, “this type of ‘empiricism’ is so out 
of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a priori for present 
purposes.” Id. at 318. Nonetheless, the differences between the views of Rothbard and Hoppe on 
the action axiom’s epistemology are primarily terminological and their views of the action axiom’s 
epistemology are substantively similar. See generally Gennady Stolyarov II, The Compatibility of 
Hoppe’s and Rothbard’s Views of the Action Axiom, 10 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 45 (2007). 
 103  Georges Rey, The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ (last updated Oct. 12, 2017). 
 104  Id. 
 105  HOPPE, supra note 102, at 17. 
 106  Michael Vacca, Quine: Terms in Translation, in QUINE TERMS EXPLAINED (2004). 
 107  Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/analytic-synthetic-distinction (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
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In addition, there is a further distinction: a priori vs. a posteriori.108 This 
Article adopts Hans Herman Hoppe’s conception of the a priori vs. a posteriori 
distinction.109 Under this view of the distinction, the truth of a priori statements 
are justifiable independent of verification or falsification of observational 
experience, while the truth value of a posteriori statements depends upon the 
verification or falsification of observational experience.110 Notably, this 
description of the distinction differs from Immanuel Kant’s classical 
interpretation of the a priori that holds that a priori propositions are justifiable 
independent of all experience.111 Here, a priori knowledge is still derived from 
experience broadly, but includes knowledge derived at least in part from inner 
experience and self-reflection.112 Thus, under this Article’s conception of the 
distinction, a priori synthetic statements are statements that are not merely true 
by definition and cannot be justified solely based on observation. Given this, a 
priori synthetic statements are those propositions where the means of formal 
logic are necessary but not sufficient and verifiable or falsifiable observational 
experience is unnecessary to establish the proposition’s truth.113 Therefore, these 
are propositions where “one cannot deny their truth without self-contradiction; 
that is, in attempting to deny them one would actually, implicitly, admit their 
truth.”114 
The action axiom is a true a priori synthetic proposition since (1) its truth 
cannot be established through formal logic alone because the action axiom is not 
true by definition; and (2) verifiable or falsifiable observational experience is 
unnecessary to establish the action axiom’s validity because the action axiom can 
be justified independently of verifiable or falsifiable observational experience.115 
The axiom’s truth exists in the fact that any attempt to refute the truth of the 
action axiom presupposes the axiom’s truth.116 In order to say, “Humans do not 
 
 108  A Priori and A Posteriori, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019); see generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781). 
 109  Rothbard differed from Hoppe noting that he “would consider the axiom a law of reality 
rather than a law of thought, and hence ‘empirical’ rather than ‘a priori.’” Rothbard, Extreme 
Apriorism, supra note 102, at 318. However, he notes, “it should be obvious that this type of 
‘empiricism’ is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a 
priori for present purposes.” Id. The difference between Rothbard’s and Hoppe’s position is 
primarily terminological. 
 110  See HOPPE, supra note 102, at 17–18, 24–25. See Stolyarov, supra note 102, at 56–57. 
 111  See Stolyarov, supra note 102, at 56–57. 
 112  See id. at 53; see also HOPPE, supra note 102, at 19. 
 113  See HOPPE, supra note 102, at 17–18. 
 114  Id. at 18. 
 115  Id. at 22. 
 116  Id. at 64. 
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act willfully”117 one must act willfully. In order to refute the idea, one must 
necessarily have the goal or intention to refute the idea and employ means 
towards the goal of refuting the idea. In the attempt to refute the action axiom, 
the means are the bodily movements that produce the spoken or written words. 
Any attempt to refute the action axiom is by logical necessity a willed action. 
Nothing can disprove the statement that humans act willfully because any 
attempt to disprove or falsify it would result in a logical contradiction known as 
a performative contradiction. As the axiom’s truth can be justified independently 
of experimentation or verifiable or falsifiable observations, no observation can 
possibly falsify the action axiom.118 In this sense, the action axiom is necessarily 
true and logically irrefutable. 
Importantly, as the epistemological position this Article takes, 
knowledge of the action axiom is derived from experience of reality broadly: the 
internal experience of reason and self-reflection one undertakes to understand 
the action axiom.119 This differs from Mises’s possible idealistic conception of 
the action axiom. Mises may have, as some have interpreted him, believed the 
action axiom as a priori to all experience and thus believed the action axiom was 
solely a law of the mind and not of objective reality (outside the mind).120 The 
typical criticism of this view and the traditional, orthodox Kantian view of a 
priori synthetic propositions is that if a priori synthetic propositions are solely 
laws of the mind, it could not be explained why these laws would also need to be 
laws of reality.121 One would have to rely on the idealist assumption that reality 
is a creation of the mind to claim a priori knowledge expresses anything about 
reality.122 Therefore, to avoid having to make this assumption, this Article asserts 
the position that the action axiom is not merely a law of thought but a “law of 
reality” since understanding it is only derived from one’s experience in 
interacting with the real world. 
B. The Compatibility of the Action Axiom with Epiphenomenalism 
The action axiom is true and logically irrefutable whether folk 
psychology correctly and causally describes human behavior or not. A simple 
hypothetical can illuminate this. Let us return to the legal murder hypothetical 
 
 117  Given the multiple meanings of the term “willfully” in the law, it is important to clarify that 
the term willfully as used in this Article is merely a different conjugation of the word “willed.” In 
this Article, acting willfully means engaging in willed behavior or praxeological action. 
 118  See HOPPE, supra note 102, at 24. 
 119  ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
 120  Rothbard, Extreme Apriorism, supra note 102, at 317–18. But see generally HOPPE, supra 
note 102; Stolyarov, supra note 102. 
 121  HOPPE, supra note 102, at 69. 
 122  Id. 
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outlined the introduction of this Article. However, in returning to this 
hypothetical we will presume the law disposes of substantive legal requirement 
of folk psychology for the voluntary act element of actus reus. For this 
hypothetical, we will also assume that neuroscience shows that all mental states 
are epiphenomenal, not just Smith’s mental states in killing Johnson. 
Nevertheless, even under the assumption that mental states are epiphenomenal, 
Smith’s defense could never negate the actus reus of Smith’s killing of Johnson 
by labeling his intention epiphenomenal, nor could they logically state that there 
is no such thing as a willed bodily movement. For example, if Smith’s defense 
team were to say, “The voluntary act requirement of actus reus can never be 
established. Voluntary acts as willed bodily movements do not exist. Humans do 
not act willfully because of X,” where “X” is any argument that the defense could 
hypothetically present. Applying the framework of Part II, any argument Smith’s 
defense makes would be a willed behavior and a self-contradictory argument. 
Suppose Smith’s defense attorney tries to rebut this idea by arguing that 
the intentionality of his refutation was illusory. This argument would be futile 
under praxeology. The attorney could charge, “I did not truly act intentionally; a 
cognitive mechanism determined the fact that I would say those words. My 
apparent intentionality was merely a post-rationalization of my conscious of this 
mechanism just as Smith’s stabbing of Johnson was.” However, even if this were 
true, it would not change that the defense’s refutation was an intentional act and 
bodily movement. 
To demonstrate this, this Article formulates a mechanistic explanation 
of action that is consistent with voluntariness studies described in Part I for this 
hypothetical. For this hypothetical, the hypothetical defense team of Smith’s case 
adopts this same mechanistic model for action. We will assume intention occurs 
after the brain has determined bodily movement in this hypothetical. Here, bodily 
movement will be entirely independent of intention. Intention in this hypothetical 
will simply conform to the mechanism that determines bodily movement after-
the-fact and play no causal role in bodily movement.  
For this mechanistic model of action, let Mechanism 1 represent the 
cognitive mechanism that begins a causal chain that independently determines 
Smith’s attorney’s outward bodily movement and actual statement of the denial 
of the action axiom. Let Mechanism 2 represent the causal impetus of the 
attorney’s intention or end to refute the action axiom. First, Mechanism 1 sets in 
motion a causal chain that determines the attorney’s words “man does not act” 
prior to Mechanism 2 even forming the intention to refute the action axiom. After 
Mechanism 1 is in motion, Mechanism 2 responds to Mechanism 1 and causes 
Smith’s attorney to form the intention to refute the action axiom. Smith’s 
attorney then utters the words, “Man does not act.” The act of speaking these 
words was entirely undetermined by Mechanism 2 and only determined by 
Mechanism 1.  
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Even under this framework, the attorney still engaged in voluntary 
action. The structure of the hypothetical action was exactly as Mises described 
the necessary structure of action: the attorney employed means, the statement 
“Humans do not act willfully,” aimed towards a desired end, the intention to 
refute the action axiom.  
The defense attorney though may further argue, “I did not choose or aim 
my means, the means were chosen before I even willed them.” However, the 
attorney did choose his means. He formed an intention to rebut the action axiom 
through the words “Humans do not act willfully,” and the subsequent physical 
act was the act that he chose: he made a choice. The bodily movement that 
occurred was the actual bodily movement that was willed internally. The bodily 
movement of the refutation was willed. Even if the critic’s intention did not 
actually cause the physical manifestation of the refutation the critic still willed 
and intended the physical act of the refutation. The structure of action is the same 
whether or not intention determined the physical act.  
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Suppose the attorney responds to the argument by asserting that he only 
had an intention to refute the action axiom because his mind was merely 
rationalizing an already determined bodily movement. This argument though 
would be misplaced and irrelevant to the action axiom’s truth. It does not matter 
that Mechanism 2 changed the attorney’s intention in response to the impending 
physical manifestation generated by Mechanism 1. The causes of the choice of 
man’s desires are irrelevant. It was still the attorney’s will no matter what caused 
him to will that action. Praxeology and the action axiom do not require some sort 
of metaphysical free will as this hypothetical argument implies. Even if some 
other mechanism other than intention determined man’s choice and desired end 
it was still a choice: a voluntary, willed action. Mises shared this view:  
Praxeology is not concerned with the metaphysical problem of 
free will as opposed to determinism. Its fundamental insight is 
the incontestable fact that man is in a position to choose among 
different states of affairs with regard to which he is not neutral 
and which are incompatible with each other, i.e., which he 
cannot enjoy together. It does not assert that a man’s choice is 
independent of antecedent conditions, physiological and 
psychological. It does not enter into a discussion of the motives 
determining the choice. It does not ask why a customer prefers 
one pattern of a necktie to another or a motorcar to a horse and 
buggy. It deals with the choosing as such, with the categorical 
elements of choice and action.123 
A willed bodily movement is not necessarily a freely willed bodily 
movement. As Part I argued, criminal law does not require freely willed action 
only willed action. The determined or undetermined origins of voluntary acts are 
thus irrelevant questions for this Article and Smith’s hypothetical case. Smith’s 
defense team could not deny the action axiom without false and self-
contradictory statements no matter how they model or explain action.  
This Article demonstrates that willed bodily movement exists even if we 
presume that the folk psychological conception of action is universally false for 
all human behavior. Actus reus does not require folk psychology to aver 
voluntary action. Criminal law should adopt praxeology as a theory of action. 
Furthermore, as Part III demonstrated, praxeology is fully compatible with 
positive law. 
IV. THE COMPATIBILITY OF PRAXEOLOGY AND POSITIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
The praxeological proof that willed action exists independent of its 
underlying causes is fully compatible with positive criminal law. The law 
 
 123  LUDWIG VON MISES, MONEY, METHOD, AND THE MARKET PROCESS 19 (1990). 
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maintains that thoughts alone cannot constitute a crime. A skeptic of praxeology 
in the law could inquire the following: “If bodily movements are not the result 
of mental states, doesn’t actus reus merely become an element of thought?” This 
skepticism would be misguided. As described in Part I, actus reus contains both 
an act (or omission) and voluntariness requirement.124 Criminal law can dispose 
of the folk psychology requirement of voluntariness and keep the act element of 
actus reus. Acts can be involuntary or voluntary.125 Thus, folk psychology is not 
a requirement of the “act” element of voluntary act requirement. 
The skeptic though could further ask, “What if an act exists 
simultaneously with the mental state of intention such that the act was uncaused 
by the intention, but the act precisely corresponded with the intention?” The 
reader should consider the following hypothetical situation to elucidate this 
skeptical view. A skeptic may posit the following situation: individual A wills a 
rock to fall on individual B’s head such that he believes his will would cause a 
rock to fall on B’s head in same way he believes his will causes his own bodily 
movement. Coincidentally, a rock falls on individual B’s head. However, the 
rock fell on individual B’s head for reasons completely independent of any 
thought or prior or current physical movement of Individual A. Under the law, 
the individual’s actions would not be a crime given only this information. How 
then is this distinguishable from individual A willing to throw rock at individual 
B and a mental mechanism separate from his will throws the rock at individual 
A? Both acts would not be caused by intention.  
First, an act is a bodily movement. Even if individual A formed an 
irrational intention of performing an act that was the psychological equivalent to 
an intention of an actual bodily movement, there was no bodily movement to 
constitute an act under the law. Second, removal of mental state causation from 
actus reus does not imply removal of any other form of legal causation. In the 
latter case, individual A actually threw a rock at individual B; individual A 
actually caused the act. But for individual A’s bodily movement, B would not 
have been hit on the head by the rock. Although a mechanism of his mind other 
than his will caused the act, his mind and body nonetheless still caused the action.  
Praxeology does not vitiate any existing legal ideas. If we remove folk 
psychology from actus reus and reframe voluntariness through praxeology 
nothing in positive law would change. This Article does not advocate dispensing 
of any other legal idea other than the folk psychological theory of action in 
voluntary act requirement of actus reus. The only aspect of the law that would 
change is that a praxeological conception of action would eliminate the 
possibility of legal voluntariness becoming a meaningless concept. As asserted 
in Part II, praxeological action is substantively equivalent to voluntary acts and 
 
 124  See supra Part I. 
 125  See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 5.1. 
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omissions in the law.126 The behaviors currently considered voluntary acts and 
omissions under the law would be the same using praxeology. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Praxeology gives criminal law a way to reconcile voluntariness with 
neuroscience. The law can preserve its core ideas without relying on potentially 
skewed assumptions regarding bodily movement. Praxeology does not need to 
answer the question of how action is caused or determined. The ideas of 
praxeology are true without making any assumptions about human psychology 
and the origins of bodily movement.  
The causal nature of action is still an open question. The fact that it is an 
open question though does not mean we can assume that the intuitive 
assumptions about the relationship between our mind and are body are true. Folk 
psychology may be disproven. Neuroscientific advancements are increasing the 
probability that folk psychology is false. If the law adopts praxeology as theory 
of action in actus reus, the legal concept can be preserved no matter what is 
eventually discovered about the nature of action. 
 If the law adopts praxeology as a theory of action, the moral and legal 
dilemma of Smith’s case in the introduction of this Article would never arise. 
Smith’s case would have a decisively different outcome. As Part II demonstrated, 
even if Smith’s defense team was able to show that Smith’s mental states did not 
cause Smith’s bodily movements in stabbing Johnson, this would be irrelevant 
in determining whether Smith willed his stabbing. Smith irrefutably willed to 
stab Johnson. The action produced by Smith’s body was the action Smith 
intended and willed, whether or not Smith’s intention caused the actual bodily 
movements associated with his actions. This is an a priori and irrefutable truth. 
Any denial of the intentionality of Smith’s behavior would be a contradiction of 
the action axiom. Society would never have to fear that an iniquitous crime like 
Smith’s would be unaddressed by the law because of a failure to establish actus 
reus on the grounds of a lack of mental state causation.  
 
 126  See supra Part II. 
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